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ST AT£ or NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ULSTER 
In the Matter of tbe Application of 
MELVlN GASS', 07-R-4 182 
Petitioner, 
For n Judgment Pursunnt to Article 78 
of 1he Civil Practice Law and Rules 
-against-
THE NEW YORK STA TE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
Respondent. 
(Supreme Court, Ulster County, Special Term) 
APPEARA.\JCES: 
Melvin Gass, 07·R~4 ! 82 
Wallkill Correctional Facility 
50 McKendrick Road 
P. 0. Box G 
\Vallkitl, New York 12589 
Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman 
Attorney General of New York Sm1e 
Attorney for Respondent 
(Laurn A. Sprague, Assistant Anorney General, 
of Counsel) 
Department of Law 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
Connolly, J.: 
DECISION AND ORDER 
!ndexNo. 12-3199 
RJTNo. 55-12-01873 
This is an Art icle 78 proceeding brought by petitioner challenging respondent's November 
9, 2011 denial of parole release. Petitioner plead guilty to the following crimes; (i) Anempted 
Murder in the Second Degree, (ii) Assault in the First Degree; (iii) Assault in the Second Degree, (iv) 
Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, (v) Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the 
Third Degree, (vi) Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree, (vii) Criminal Contempt in the first 
Degree, (viii) Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree, and (ix) Endangering the Welfare of a 
Child. The sentences upon S\lch convictions arc 10 run concurrently with the lengthiest sentence 
consisting of a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 12 years. The convictions arose from an incident 
involving petitioner shooting the victim four limes striking her in her right shoulder, left shoulder, 
upper neck and behind her ear. Petitioner asserted that he was upset because the victim, the mother 
of his daughter, hnd 1101 let him see his dnughter. The victim had a valid Order of Protection against 
petitioner at the time of the incident. Pclitioner subsequently fled to Indiana where he remained for 
10 years untiJ he was arrested in 2006. 
In its decision denying Petitioner parole release, the Board stated: 
24 months, denied. Next appearance 11 /2013. 
Parole denied. After n personal interview, record review, and deliberation, this pnnel finds 
your release is incompttrible with the public safety and welfare. 
Your instanl offenses involved your attempted murder of a known female by shooting 
her multiple times, despite the prior iss\lance of an order of protection. 
Consideration has been given to your receipt of an earned eligibility certificate, 
good behavior and programming, however, due to your course of conduct, that includes, 
carry ing and ultimately using a handgun, your release nt this time is denied. There is a 
rensonable probability you would not live and remain at liberty without violat·ing the law. 
Petitioner's administrative appeal was received by the Appeals Unit on January g, 2012. The 
Appeals Unit affirmed the Board of Parole's decision, mailing such decision to petitioner's attorney 
on August 6, 2012, though it did not file a determination within four months of receipt of petitioner's 
appeal. This a11icle 78 proceeding was filed September 11, 2012. 
Pet it ioner advances che fol I owing arguments in this proceeding, incorporating the arguments 
made in his appeal': I) tbat the Board of Parole ("Boarcl") did not consider the requireci statutory 
foctors; 2) that the Bonrd based its decision solely on the petitioner's instant offense and his criminal 
'The Appeal was provided to the Court by respondent. 
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record; 3) that the Board commissioners were not foir and impartial; 4) that the Board's decision did 
not provide adequate detail; 5) that the Board did not consider the imprisonment guidelines; 6) 
thnl the Board did not consider the petitioner's institutional achievements; 7) that the 
Board did not give adequate consideration to petitioner's earned eligibility certificate; 8) that the 
hold of 24 months constituted a resentencing; 9) that the Board's decision denied petitioner due 
process of law and his right to Equal Protection; and 10) the Board did not properly consider and 
apply the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law to his parole hearing. 
The Board's actions are jutlicial in nature and may not be rev iewed if done in accordance 
with the law (sae Exec\ltive Law §259-i(5] see also Matter of Valderrama v. Travis, 19 AD3d 904, 
905 [3rd Dept. , 2005]). Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A) provides that discretionary release to parole 
supervision is not to be granted to an irunate merely as a reward for good behavior while in prison, 
but after considering whether "there is~ reasonable probability that, if such an inmate is released, 
he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not ineompntible 
with ihe welfare of society aud will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine 
respect for law" (lvfatter of King v. New York State Division of Parole, 83 NY2cl 788, 790 fl 994), 
affg 190 AD2d 423 [1 51 Dept., 1993]). Decisions regarding release on parole are discretionary and 
will not be disl11rbed if they satisfy the stututory requirements (Executive Law§ 259-i; Matter of 
Walker v. New York Stale Div. of Parola, 203 AD2d 757 [3'd Dept., 1994]) and there is no showing 
of"irrationality bordering on impropriety" (M~mar of Russo v. New York Swte Bd. of Parole, 50 
NY2d 69, 77 [1980]; Maner a/Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000}; Mauer of Saunders v. 
Travis, 238 AD2d 688 (3'd Dept., l 997]; Mauer of Felder v. Tl'avis, 278 AD2d 570 [3'd Dept., 
2000]). 
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Initially, respondent asserts that certain of petitioner's arguments were WHived as they were 
not raised in his administrative appeal, namely: l) that the Board was not foir and impartial, 2) the 
Board did not properly consider and apply the 201 l amendments to the Executive Law to his parole 
hearing, and 3) that the Board violated petitioner's right to Equal Protection. Such new 
arguments are not preserved for review as lhey were not raised in petitioner's administrative appeal 
(~·ee lvfa(fer of Cn1z v Travis, 273 AD2d M.fi,,649J2Q.Q.0J)., The Court notes, however, that even 
considering such assertions, as <liscussed below, such assertions are without merit. 
Executive Law §259-c (4) was amended and requires the Board to 
establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law. Such 
writt~n procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the rehabilitation 
of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of sttccess of such persons upon release, 
nnd assist members of the state board of parole in determining which in.mates may be 
released to parole supervision. 
In addition, Executive Law §259-i (2)(c) was amended to list all of lhe factors the Board is 
reguired to consider in making parole release determinations in the same provision. Such 
amendment did not add new factors for consideration but list all fncrors in the sam~ paragraph. 
As pelitioner was committed to the custody of the department in 2007, a transition 
accountability plan ("TAP") has not been prepared for petitioner (see Corrections Law §71-a), 
however, the record inclt1des a copy of the inmate status report. The record reflects that the Board 
considered, inter alia, petitioner's institut ional records including his institutional achievements, 
disciplinal)' record and release plans. The Board, in its Decision stated its consideration of 
p<:titioner's earned eligibility certificate, good behavior and programming. During the interview, the 
Board discussed the steps petitioner had taken toward rehabilitation including his receipt of a11 
cu med eligibility certificate, his participation in air condition/refrigeration and builder/maintenance 
progrums; his work as a reacher's aide ~md industries worker, discu~sed petitioner's plans to live with 
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his parents and assist in taking care of hi:> sick mother, aclmowledgcd receipt of letters from 
pe1 itioner's sister and a cousin, noted petitioner's Jack of any Tier II's or l IJ's and noted that petjtioner 
hnd fled the state after the incident and remnined in Indiana for ten years. 
The record reflects that the Board, in its consideration of lhe statutory criteria set forth in 
Executive Law §259-I (2)(c)(A)(i) through (viii), ascert!lined the steps petitioner had taken towards 
his rehabilitation and the likelihood of his succe:;s if released to parole supervision. Accordingly, 
pdi ti oner's contention that the Board did not properly consider and apply the 20 I 1 amendments to 
Executive Law§ 259-c (4) is without meril. 
Further, the Court rejects any claim that the Board violated Executive Law§ 259"1 (2)(c)(A)'s 
requirements. The record demonstrntes that the Board considered the relevant statutory factors, such 
as petitioner's receipt of an earned eligibility certificate, institutional programming and achievements, 
discipl inary record, and release plans (see Executive La\\!§ 259-I; Maller of Marcus v. Alexander, 
54 ADJd 476, 476-477 [3rd Dept., 2008); Maller ofG111kaiss v. New York State Div. of Parole, 50 
A03d 1418, 1418-1419 (3rd Dept., 2008]). Though petitioner received an earned eligibility 
certificate, the Parole Bonrd dctennined that lhere was a reasonable! probabHi ly that the petitioner 
could not remain at liberty without violming the law. "(W)hile the relevant statutory factors must 
be considered, it is well-settled that the weight to be accorded lo each of the factors lies solely within 
the discrerion of the Parole Board. Moreover, the Board is not required to expressly discuss each of 
the guidelines in its determination." (Matier of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 AD3d l 7, 21 -22 (lst Dept., 
2007], Iv appl dismissed 9 NY3d 956 [2007], quoting Mauer of Walker v. Travis, 252 AD2d 360, 
362 [ l st Dept., I 998)). While petitioner's institutional record is to be considered, there is no 
rt!quirement that the Board place an equnl or greater weight on petitioner's institutional record than 
on the gravity of the instant offense, that is, shooting his child's mother four times while under an 
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active order of protection, and a detennination thal such record is outweighed by the severity of the 
instant offense is within the Board's discretion (see Anthony v. New York Stc1te Division of Parole, 
17 AD3d 301 [lsl Dept., 2005]; Herben v. New York Stale Board of Parole, 97 AD2d 128 [!st 
Dept, 1983 ]). Further, the Board's denial of parole does not constitute a re-sentencing (see Malfer 
of Marsh v NYS Division of Parole, 31 AD3d 898 [3rd Dept., 2006)); Murray v Evans, 83 AD3d 
1320[ 3rd Depl., 2011). Moreover, petitioner's due process argument is without merit. Petitioner has 
no due process right to parole (see Maller of Russo v. New York State Board of Parole, 50 NY2d 69 
[I 988)). Further, under ow· senr~ncing S)_'.Stem the court initially sets a minimum and a maximum 
period of incarceration, but the Board makes the ultimate deter~4i.ation whether to r~ease an inmate 
prior to his or her completion of the maxi~~l'E_!.~~~~~~ (Marter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 
476 [2000)). 
Even considering petitioner's equal protection claim, such claim is without merit. Petitioner 
a lieges that he was denied equal protection of the Jaw as the Board allegedly continued to use his ... 
''p•ISt criminal history" ro deny his release. Jn analyzing an eq\lal protection claim, "[s]lricl scrutiny 
is applied in only two in.stunccs, where the statutory or regulatory classification impinges on 
limdamental rights or discriminates against a suspect class." (see Jimenez v. Coughlin, 117 A.D.2d 
1,4 (3 rd Dept., 1986]). Petitioner has no fundamental right to be "prematurely released from 
confinement" nor has he demonstrated that he was treated differently from others similarly situated. 
Accordingly, the rational basis standard applies to petitioner's claim (Id.). The record reflects, 
however, that the Board considered the relevant statutory factors, petitioner has not demonstrated 
he was treated differently from any other inmate appearing before the Board and, additionally, the 
Board provided u rationul basis for their denial of petitioner's release to parole supervision. 
Accordingly, such claim is withoui merit. 
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Additionally, even were the Court to consider petitioner's claim that he was denied a fair and 
impartial hearing as he alleges his receipt of an Earned Eligibility Certificate was not properly 
considered, as noted above, and ns acknowledged by petitioner, receipt of such certificate does not 
preclude the Board from concluding that petitioner should not be released to parole supervision (see 
Mafler of Cornejo v. New York Stare Division of Parole, 269 AD2d 713 [3d Dept., 2000]). 
Petitioner's remaining contentions have been reviewed and found to be without merit. 
Petilioner has failed to meet his burden of prese11ting evidence demonstrating that the Board violated 
any positive statutory requirement in determining not to release him. The record supports the 
rationality of the Board's determination, and it certainly cannot be held that the determination is so 
irrationol as to border on impropriety (Maller of J<usso v. New York State Board of Parole, 50 NY2d 
69, 77 [1980]; Matter of Wright v. Parole Division, 132 AD2d 821, 822 [3rd Dept. , 1987)). 
Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner has failed to mecc his burden of proof in ttus proceeding. 
The Court observes that certain records ofa confidential nature relating to the petitioner were 
submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order, is sealing nil records 
submitted for in camera review. 
Therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that lhe petition is hereby dismissed and the reliefrequested in this proceeding 
is in all respects denied, and it is further 
ORDERED, that the confidential records submitted to the Court for in came1·a review are 
scaled. 
This Memorandum constitutes the Decision and Order of the Cou1t. This original Decision 
and Order ttnd confidential records are being returned to the attorney for the respondent. The below 
referenced original papers are being mailed to the Ulster County Clerk. The signing of this 
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Decision anti Order shall not constitute entry or filing under CPLR 2220. Counsel is not 
rellc'1ed from the provision of that rule rcg;1rding filing, entry or notice of entry the Ulster 
County Clerk. 
SO ORDERED. 
ENTER. 
Dntcd: February L 20 I J 
Kingston, New York 
Papers Considered: 
Gerald W. Connolly 
Acting Supreme Court Just 
I. Order to Show Cause dated October 12, 2012; Notice of Petition; Verified 
Petition dated August 27, 20L2 with memomndum of law. 
2. Verified Answer dated December 11, 2012; Affirmation of Laura A. Sprague, 
Esq. dated December 1 l, 2012 with accompanying exhibits. 
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